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Abstract
The provision point mechanism as a method of funding threshold public goods is ex-
tended with refund bonuses. Each contributor not only has his contribution refunded
in the case of insufficient contributions but also receives a refund bonus proportional to
his proposed contribution. As long as the refund bonus pool does not exceed the net
value of the public good, in equilibrium the public good is always provided and refund
bonuses are never distributed. In this paper, we empirically investigate this extension
of the provision point mechanism in a laboratory experiment by testing its properties
on allocative and distributive efficiency, equilibrium coordination, and invariance to in-
formation distribution. Individuals respond to the incentives induced by refund bonuses
as predicted, but systematic deviations exist that are consistent with quantal response
equilibrium. Since this simple mechanism has considerable practical potential especially
in crowdfunding, these promising initial results call for further experimental work.
Keywords: Public goods, provision point mechanism, refund bonus, crowdfunding
JEL: C72, C92, D82, H41
1. Introduction
The voluntary provision of public goods remains one of the most challenging prob-
lems of economic design. Starting with the seminal works of Clarke (1971), Groves
(1973), and Groves and Ledyard (1977), many novel solutions have been proposed to
this problem, which at least until Olson (1965) was deemed impossible to resolve. Yet
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when technological developments made the application of decentralized provision meth-
ods feasible, the choice of practitioners – particularly in crowdfunding – fell on the simple
voluntary contribution mechanism or, with a restriction to threshold public goods made
henceforth, the provision point mechanism of the same form used by Benjamin Franklin
in 18th-century America.1 This choice was motivated by the simple structure of the mech-
anism and not its incentive properties, since it is fraught with the classical free riding
problem and subject to the asymptotic non-provision result of Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990).
Despite its weak implementation properties, the provision point mechanism helped
raise over 5 billion US dollars (estimated) in crowdfunding revenue worldwide in 2013, a
nearly ten-fold increase in revenue since 2009 (Massolution (2014)).2 However, a valid
concern can be raised about the robustness of the present growth of crowdfunding, espe-
cially for community, charity, or creative projects. The current growth may be primarily
driven through contributions submitted by the population of socially minded consumers,
and growth may wane as this population is exhausted.3 Consequently, the problem of
attracting contributions from a broader range of consumers will come to the fore if high
levels of voluntary contributions are to be sustained and grown. As a possible solution
to this problem, Zubrickas (2014) proposes a refinement to the provision point mecha-
nism that improves its properties up to strict implementation while retaining its simple
structure. The present paper is an experimental study of the proposed refinement and
its properties.
The idea of the refinement is to introduce refund bonuses that are paid in the event of
insufficient contributions.4 As Zubrickas (2013, 2014) demonstrates, with refund bonuses
1In the economics literature, the provision point mechanism was formally introduced by Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1984) and Bagnoli and Lipman (1989). For reviews of experimental evidence on its
performance, see Ledyard (1995) and Chen (2008).
2While Kickstarter, the largest crowdfunding platform, reports the success rate of 39% of its initially
pre-screened fundraising campaigns (Kickstarter (2015)), the success rate can be as low as 10% for
Indiegogo, the second largest (The Verge (2013)).
3For instance, an empirical study on crowdfunding Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2014) report that a
campaigner’s own social network and contributions coming from it make an important factor for the
success of the project. With increasing project sizes, the role of this factor may accordingly diminish
making it harder to reach the contribution target.
4Also see Tabarrok (1998) for a related idea.
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set to increase in own contribution, the only equilibrium outcome is the provision of
public goods. Either competition for refund bonuses or preference for the public good
induces sufficient contributions. For example, consider the problem of raising funds for a
$10,000 public project. As under the standard provision point mechanism, the mechanism
designer solicits contributions toward the project, which is financed out of contributions
if they are sufficient for this purpose. If the threshold is not reached, contributions
are refunded and, additionally, the mechanism designer gives every contributor a refund
bonus equal to, say, 10% of their contribution.5 As long as the net utility from the project
exceeds the maximal amount of refund bonuses payable (i.e., 10% of $10,000), the only
equilibrium outcome is the implementation of the project and the refund bonuses are not
dispensed. Furthermore, by manipulating refund bonus rules it is possible to implement
the project in a unique equilibrium with Lindahl prices. Lastly, on the normative side of
analysis, the mechanism ensures that an individually rational contributor always gets a
positive utility either from the public good or from the refund bonus whereas free-riders
may end up with nothing.
In the present paper, we test the equilibrium predictions of this new provision point
mechanism brought about by the introduction of refund bonuses. We form hypothe-
ses related to allocative efficiency, equilibrium coordination, distributive efficiency, and
invariance to information distribution. The latter hypothesis draws on the aggregative
structure of the mechanism that implies that only the knowledge of aggregates matters
for individual contribution behavior. Our experimental results offer empirical support
for Nash equilibrium predictions by demonstrating that consumers respond to economic
incentives in predicted ways. The most distinguishing prediction is the non-monotonous
rate of provision with respect to the level of refund bonus. Namely, too generous refund
bonuses will work against provision as consumers would rather coordinate on a total con-
tribution just short of the provision point. Our empirical results exactly demonstrate this
relationship: Despite generous refund bonuses, consumers choose to contribute less but,
5The assumption is that the mechanism designer has a budget of her own, but one could think of
many alternative sources of refund bonuses, e.g., seed money initially raised from first movers.
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in line with the theoretical prediction, only marginally less as we observe little difference
in total contributions across different refund bonus treatments. We also compare the pro-
vision point mechanisms with and without refund bonuses. We find expected differences
in performance levels in favor of refund bonuses, which occur with a larger group size
and heterogeneous population. With respect to predictions on invariance to information
distribution and, in part, on equilibrium coordination, the closest fit is obtained when we
refine the theoretical model with bounded rationality that underlies the quantal response
equilibrium (Rosenthal (1989), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)).
The present paper belongs to the strand of literature on non-coercive methods of
fundraising for public projects. The idea of using pecuniary incentives in order to induce
contributions appears in a number of works. For example, Falkinger (1996) studies
a mechanism that rewards contributors with above-average contributions, and Morgan
(2000) studies one that induces contributions with the help of lotteries. Goeree et al.
(2005) demonstrate the advantages of the all-pay auction design in fundraising. Gerber
and Wichardt (2009) study a multi-stage mechanism that pre-commits consumers to
optimal contributions with conditionally refundable deposits. For experimental evidence
on the performance of these mechanisms, see Falkinger et al. (2000), Morgan and Sefton
(2000), Lange et al. (2007), Corazzini et al. (2010), and Gerber et al. (2013) who all
report improved allocative efficiency. For alternative fundraising methods, also see Varian
(1994), Kominers and Weyl (2012), and most recently Masuda et al. (2014). However,
apart from the lottery mechanism, the practical applicability of these mechanisms is
questionable because of their complexity and concerns for group manipulability (which
does not arise in our mechanism with refund bonuses). Furthermore, in many of these
mechanisms distributive efficiency is likely to fail as, e.g., Kearny (2005) empirically
demonstrates in the case of the lottery mechanism which proves highly regressive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the provision
point mechanism with refund bonuses, discusses its properties, and formalizes testable
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experimental design and Section 4 presents the em-
pirical results. In Section 5, we refine the model with bounded rationality and discuss
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empirical implications. The last section concludes.
2. Refund bonuses and theoretical predictions
2.1. Model
There is a public good (PG) project that benefits a group of N consumers. The cost
of the project is C and its total value to the consumers is V , with V > C. Consumer i’s
individual value for the PG is given by vi, i = 1, . . . , N , where vi ∈ [0, C) and
∑
i vi = V .
We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty about the value of the project, namely,
the total value of the project V is public information, whereas individual values are
private information.6
A mechanism designer solicits voluntary contributions toward the project. Let gi
denote consumer i’s contribution and G the sum of contributions. If G ≥ C, the project is
funded out of the contributions collected, with the excess amount G−C wasted (assumed
for the ease of exposition). If G < C, the project is not implemented and each contributor
gets his contribution refunded and, in addition, a refund bonus as a percentage r of his
own contribution. The refund bonus rule r > 0, also referred to as simply the refund
bonus r, is announced by the mechanism designer in the beginning of the campaign. We
assume that the designer possesses a budget out of which she pays refund bonuses in
the case of insufficient contributions. We denote the maximal amount of refund bonuses
payable in the limit by R = rC.
Under the proposed scheme, the payoff to consumer i is given by
pii(gi, G) = 1(G ≥ C)[vi − gi] + 1(G < C) [rgi] , (1)
where 1(.) is an index function. We assume that consumers choose contributions (without
randomizing) that constitute a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by mechanism r,
6Such an information structure can arise when the group is a representative sample, up to the first
moment, randomly drawn from the population of consumers with a known distribution of individual
values. As a practical example, if valuations for street refurbishment depend on cars driven, then a
fair estimate of the average valuation is arguably public knowledge. A similar incomplete information
– known sum environment is considered in the experimental study of the provision point mechanism by
Marks and Croson (1999), among others.
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which is short for the mechanism with refund bonus share r. Letting G−i denote the sum
of all contributions of consumers other than i, we define
Definition 1. A vector of contributions g∗ = (g∗1, ..., g
∗
N) is a Nash equilibrium if g
∗
i
maximizes pii(gi, G
∗
−i + gi) for each i.
The next proposition characterizes the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria, which we
denote by Γ(r).
Proposition 1. If 0 < R ≤ V − C, then Γ(r) = {g∗ : ∀i, g∗i ≤ 11+rvi, G∗ = C}. Other-
wise, Γ(r) = {∅}.
Proof. In equilibrium, G∗ < C cannot hold as any consumer could obtain a higher
refund bonus by marginally increasing his contribution because of r > 0. Likewise, any
consumer with a positive contribution could gain in utility by marginally decreasing his
contribution if G∗ > C. Thus, the equilibrium candidates need to have G∗ = C. A vector
g∗ is an equilibrium if for each consumer i the net utility from the PG, vi − g∗i , exceeds
the highest possible refund bonus, rg∗i , or after transformations
g∗i ≤
1
1 + r
vi. (2)
Summing up (2) yields V −C ≥ R, which is the condition for equilibrium existence as it
ensures that there is a vector g∗ such that (2) is satisfied for all i. If R > V − C, then
G∗ = C cannot hold as (2) will be violated at least for some i, implying Γ(r) = {∅}.
2.2. Equilibrium properties
According to Proposition 1, the introduction of refund bonuses induces sufficient
contributions provided that refund bonuses are not too generous. Intuitively, with a
refund amount that is increasing in own contribution the mechanism provides incentives
for consumers to contribute. Whether the consumers reach the target for provision or
contribute an amount just short of the target depends on what brings greater utility,
the refund bonuses or the PG. If the net utility of the public good, V − C, exceeds the
maximal amount of refund bonuses R, then they seek to reach the target, and vice versa.
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Another important property of the mechanism is that an increase in refund bonus r
reduces the set of equilibria, which formally follows from condition (2) – if r′ > r, then
Γ(r′) ⊆ Γ(r). Intuitively, as refund bonuses make deviations profitable, in equilibrium
each consumer has to obtain a net utility level from the PG at least as high as that
from the refund bonus if he deviates. A larger refund bonus implies a more profitable
deviation, which, in turn, implies a higher level of utility for each consumer in equilibrium.
As a result, fewer contribution profiles can be sustained as equilibria.7 In fact, when the
maximal amount of refund bonuses is set at the net value of the public good, R =
V − C, the mechanism implements the public good uniquely, altogether overcoming the
equilibrium coordination problem. Furthermore, the unique equilibrium has a special
feature. All consumers contribute the same proportion of their values, i.e., gi =
C
V
vi,
resulting in distributive efficiency.
The game induced by the mechanism is aggregative and, furthermore, aggregate in-
variant – the sum of individual payoffs,
∑
i pii, depends on aggregates V and G only
and is independent of the distribution of individual contributions or valuations. Put
differently, what matters for individual decisions is the aggregate valuation of the PG,
not the distribution of individual valuations and not even the knowledge of valuations of
other consumers. Thus, as long as individual valuations sum to the same amount, their
distribution does not affect the equilibrium outcome.
We illustrate the mechanism and its equilibrium properties with an example, which
introduces the experimental parameterization and forms the basis for our experimen-
tal hypotheses. Suppose that the PG project costs C = 200, for which a group of
N = 5 consumers has an aggregate valuation of V =
∑5
i=1 vi = 300. When the refund
bonus is set at r = 0.25, the equilibrium set is Γ(0.25) =
{
g∗ : ∀i, g∗i ≤ 45vi, G∗ = 200
}
,
and when it is increased to r = 0.50, the equilibrium set becomes singleton, Γ(0.50) ={
g∗ : ∀i, g∗i = 23vi, G∗ = 200
}
. However, when the refund bonus is set at r = 0.75, there
is no equilibrium in continuous strategies. With discrete strategies, the equilibrium set is
7This also implies that certain normative relative contribution rules are no longer equilibria as r rises,
such as equality of earnings or equality of contributions (Reuben and Riedl (2013)).
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Figure 1: Total Payoff Π(G)
found to be Γ(0.75) =
{
g∗ : ∀i, g∗i ≥ 47vi, G∗ = 200− 
}
, where  is the smallest currency
unit.
Figure 1 plots the total payoffs, which we denote by Π(G), for these three different
refund bonus levels. The refund bonus tilts upwards the total payoff graph on the interval
of aggregate contributions below the provision point. At refund bonus r = 0.25, the
payoff function Π(G) is discontinuous at G = 200 yet upper semicontinuous, at r = 0.50
it is continuous, which explains the equilibrium uniqueness, but at r = 0.75 the upper
semicontinuity is no longer preserved, which is behind the non-existence of equilibria in
continuous strategies.
Finally, the equilibrium outcome of Proposition 1 can also be achieved with mecha-
nisms using different refund bonus schemes. The most important condition is that the
refund bonus amount increases in own contribution. For instance, consider the mecha-
nism where in the case of insufficient contributions the designer promises to distribute a
fixed amount of bonus money M among the contributors in shares gi
G
M . It is straight-
forward to demonstrate that this mechanism is equivalent in equilibrium outcomes, both
at individual and aggregate levels, to the analyzed mechanism r where r = M/C. In our
example, mechanisms r = 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 are equivalent to mechanisms with bonus
money M = 50, 100, and 150, respectively.
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2.3. Hypotheses
For the PG project with parameter values V = 300, C = 200, and the smallest cur-
rency unit  = 1 we articulate five hypotheses that deal with the equilibrium predictions
of the mechanisms r = 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75.
Hypothesis 1 (Allocation). The rate of PG provision is similar for refund bonus r =
0.25 and r = 0.50, but is lower for r = 0.75.
Hypothesis 2 (Aggregate contributions). Aggregate contributions are similar for all
refund bonus shares r.
Hypothesis 3 (Coordination). For r = 0.25, 0.50, aggregate contribution tends to-
ward 200 but for r = 0.75 toward 199. The equilibrium is reached faster for r = 0.50.
Hypothesis 4 (Information/Value asymmetry). Aggregate outcomes are indepen-
dent of the distribution of individual values.
Hypothesis 5 (Distributive efficiency). For the mechanism r = 0.50, contributions
tend toward two thirds of individual values.
Lastly, we also make an attempt to compare performance of mechanisms with and
without refund bonuses. In our example, under the standard provision point mechanism
(r = 0) the set of equilibria consists of the subset of inefficient equilibria, {g∗ : G∗ ≤
200 − max(vi)}, and the subset of efficient equilibria, {g∗ : ∀i, g∗i ≤ vi, G∗ = 200}. Re-
garding equilibrium selection, two opposing predictions are distinguished in the economics
literature. On one hand, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) argue that inefficient equilibria are
not robust to the refinement of undominated perfect equilibrium. Intuitively, if con-
sumers’ actions are subject to trembles, then a positive contribution dominates a zero
contribution.8 On the other hand, Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) argue that the ineffi-
cient outcome is more likely to emerge if the size of population is large. In particular, if
a consumer’s contribution is pivotal only with a small probability, then the consumer is
better off by contributing nothing. Thus, we hypothesize
8This argument does not hold, however, in the presence of nuisance costs of contribution. See Castillo
et al. (2014) on the salience of nuisance costs for Internet donations.
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Hypothesis 6 (No refund bonuses). The rate of provision of the mechanism without
refund bonuses is similar to that of the mechanism with refund bonuses when group size
is small but is lower when group size becomes larger.
3. Experimental Design and Procedures
Design
We report data gathered from a total of 530 human subjects. The main experi-
ment features a 4x2 design, with 3 levels of the refund bonus (r = 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75)
or no refund bonus (r = 0), and heterogeneous or homogeneous values for the public
good. Subjects were placed in fixed, 5-person groups, and the threshold to fund a “group
project” was always fixed at G = 200 experimental dollars. In the homogeneous values
treatment each individual earned a payment of v = 60 if the project was funded. In the
heterogeneous values treatment each individual received a payment drawn randomly for
the round without replacement from {40, 50, 60, 70, 80}. Subjects learned their drawn v
before making their group project allocation decision each period.
The heterogeneous versus homogeneous value treatment was varied across subjects;
that is, either all periods of a session employed heterogeneous values or all periods of a
session employed homogeneous values. As shown in Table 1, the refund bonus was varied
within and across subjects. The first 30 periods of each session employed one value of r
and the second 30 periods of each session employed another value of r. The sequence was
varied in every possible combination to control for order effects. With the exception of the
no bonus condition for the late periods 31-60, at least 9 different groups of 5 participated
in each refund bonus condition for the two values environments.
Most sessions were conducted with 25 subjects (5 groups), although a few sessions
were smaller due to subject no-shows. The 5-person groups remained fixed for all 60
periods. This allows us to treat each group as an independent observation, and should
also promote learning in this coordination game with multiple equilibria. The final period
was not announced in advance.
We supplemented the main experimental design summarized in Table 1 with 90 ad-
ditional subjects in two follow-up environments all with the homogeneous (v = 60 for all
10
Table 1: Main Experimental Design
Payment v Refund bonus Number of Number of
Periods 1-30 Periods 31-60 Subjects Groups
60 r = 0.25 r = 0.50 25 5
60 r = 0.25 r = 0.75 25 5
60 r = 0.25 r = 0 25 5
60 r = 0.50 r = 0.25 25 5
60 r = 0.50 r = 0.75 20 4
60 r = 0.75 r = 0.25 25 5
60 r = 0.75 r = 0.50 25 5
60 r = 0 r = 0.50 20 4
60 r = 0 r = 0.75 25 5
{40, 50, 60, 70, 80} r = 0.25 r = 0.50 25 5
{40, 50, 60, 70, 80} r = 0.25 r = 0.75 25 5
{40, 50, 60, 70, 80} r = 0.50 r = 0.25 25 5
{40, 50, 60, 70, 80} r = 0.50 r = 0.75 25 5
{40, 50, 60, 70, 80} r = 0.50 r = 0 25 5
{40, 50, 60, 70, 80} r = 0.75 r = 0.25 25 5
{40, 50, 60, 70, 80} r = 0.75 r = 0.50 25 5
{40, 50, 60, 70, 80} r = 0 r = 0.25 25 5
{40, 50, 60, 70, 80} r = 0 r = 0.75 25 5
consumers) value condition. As in the main experiment, these follow-up sessions included
60 periods with a treatment switch after period 30. One follow-up environment increased
the group size to N = 10 in order to evaluate Hypothesis 6. When making this change in
group size we simultaneously increase the threshold to G = 400 to fund the public good
to keep the “step return” constant at 1.5 (Croson and Marks (2000)). This is similar
to the group size change in Bagnoli and McKee (1991). A total of 40 subjects (4 fixed
and independent groups) participated in these larger group sessions, 20 beginning with
no bonus and switching to a refund bonus of 0.25 and 20 beginning with a refund bonus
of 0.25 and switching to no bonus.
The second follow-up environment changed the refund bonus from a fraction of the
consumers’ contribution to a share of a fixed fund that is proportional to the amount
of her contribution relative to the total contributions made by members of her group.
As noted above, this version of the mechanism has identical incentive properties and the
same equilibria as the more simplified refund bonus version implemented in the main
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experiment. A total of 50 subjects (10 fixed and independent groups) participated in
these sessions, 25 beginning with a fund of 50 (equivalent to the 50/200 = 0.25 refund
bonus) and switching to a fund of 150 (equivalent to the 150/200 = 0.75 refund bonus),
and 25 beginning with a fund of 150 and switching to a fund of 50. This version of the
mechanism performs similarly to the refund fraction version, so we do not report the
results explicitly.
Procedures
An experimenter reads the instructions (distributed to subjects in hardcopy and shown
in the Appendix) at the beginning of the session to establish common knowledge of the
game and decision task among participants. Following this instruction phase all interac-
tions were handled anonymously using a computer program written in zTree (Fischbacher
(2007)). At the end of each decision period subjects learned the total amount allocated
to the “group project,” whether the project reached the provision point threshold and
was funded, the subject’s own refund bonus if the project was not funded, as well as
period and cumulative experimental dollar earnings. Subjects were required to record
this information on a hardcopy record sheet to emphasize the saliency of this information
and to provide easy access to the game history.
Earnings accumulated across all 60 periods and were converted at a rate of 50 exper-
imental dollars = 1 U.S. dollar and paid in cash immediately at the conclusion of each
session. Each subject also began their session with an initial endowment of 200 experi-
mental dollars. Sessions typically lasted about 90 minutes and subjects earned an average
of $25.25 each. Subjects were recruited by email through a random draw from a subject
database of approximately 3,000 of the 30,000 Purdue University undergraduate students
using ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). All sessions were conducted at the Vernon Smith Exper-
imental Economics Laboratory (VSEEL) at Purdue and no subject participated in more
than one session.
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4. Results
We present the empirical findings in a series of numbered results that correspond to
the numbered hypotheses, followed by their statistical support. The first section considers
the mechanism with refund bonuses, and the second section compares the refund bonus
mechanism to the provision problem with no refund bonuses. Unless noted otherwise,
the reported statistical tests employ a five-percent significance threshold.
4.1. Performance Across Refund Bonus Treatments
Result 1 (Allocation). The public good is funded significantly less frequently when the
refund bonus is set at the high level (0.75), compared to the 0.50 and 0.25 refund bonuses.
This holds for both the homogeneous and heterogeneous value environments and becomes
stronger over time. With heterogeneous values, PG provision is more frequent with the
0.25 than the 0.50 refund bonus. For the 0.50 refund bonus only, the PG is funded more
frequently in the homogeneous than the heterogeneous value environment.
Support : Figure 2 reports the five-period moving average of the frequency that the PG is
funded for each refund bonus treatment. Panel A displays results from the homogeneous
value environment, and the declining trend in the 0.75 refund bonus treatment contrasts
sharply with the stable or rising trend in the other two refund bonus treatments. The
difference between the 0.75 treatment and the other two treatments is statistically signif-
icant in both the early 30 and the late 30 periods. For statistical tests we employ probit
models with group-level random effects and a linear time trend. Identical conclusions
follow from nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, using independent groups as the
unit of observation.9
Panel B displays results from the heterogeneous value environment, and the only
noticeable difference from Panel A is the downward trend and lower level of the PG
funding rate for the 0.50 treatment. The 0.25 refund bonus PG funding rate is significantly
9The data exhibit hysteresis, since the initial periods 31-40 following the treatment switchover appear
to be influenced by the earlier treatment; for example, the PG is funded more (less) frequently in these
periods if the earlier treatment was the high (low)-funding 0.25 (0.75) treatment. To minimize this
nuisance variation and allow for some initial learning, the nonparametric tests summarized here exclude
periods 1-10 and periods 31-40.
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Figure 2: Fraction of Periods Public Good is Funded
greater than the rate for the 0.75 and 0.50 refund bonus in both the early 30 and the
late 30 periods, and the rates for the 0.50 and 0.75 treatments are significantly different
for the late 30 periods. When controlling for the refund bonus level, funding rates differ
between the homogeneous and heterogeneous value environments only when the refund
bonus = 0.50. This holds for both the early and late 30 periods using nonparametric
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Wilcoxon tests and random effects probit regressions, although for the regressions the
difference in the early 30 periods is significant at only the ten-percent level.
Based on the Nash equilibria for this mechanism, the significantly greater PG provi-
sion rate for the 0.25 treatment compared to the 0.50 treatment for the heterogeneous
treatment is surprising. Although all equilibria are efficient in both of these treatments,
in the sense that the public good is funded and contributions are not wasted, the equi-
librium is unique in the 0.50 treatment. As noted earlier, we conjectured that this would
promote equilibrium play, since it resolves the coordination problem that arises through
the multiple equilibria of the 0.25 treatment. As we explain below in Section 5, however,
the expected costs of equilibrium deviations are much larger in the 0.25 than the 0.50
treatment, so the QRE model of boundedly rational choice is consistent with the greater
rate of efficient PG provision in the 0.25 refund bonus condition.
Result 2 (Aggregate Contributions). Total contributions to the PG are near the 200
threshold in all treatments, but they are sometimes significantly lower when the refund
bonus is at the high level (0.75) and significantly higher when the refund bonus is at
the low level (0.25). This divergence occurs more often in the later periods, and when
values are heterogeneous. Total contributions are also lower in the heterogeneous than
the homogeneous treatment, except when the refund bonus is 0.25.
Support : Figure 3 displays the five-period moving average of the average aggregate contri-
butions for each refund bonus treatment. The averages are all between 195 and 201 in the
late periods of the homogeneous value condition shown in Panel A, and the 0.75 refund
bonus is significantly below the 0.50 refund bonus treatment in periods 31-60. (Statis-
tical tests are based on a random effects regression and confirmed with nonparametric
Wilcoxon tests.) The differences in average contributions are greater in the heterogeneous
value condition (Panel B), and the 0.25 refund bonus treatment is significantly greater
than the other two refund bonus treatments in the late periods 31-60 and the 0.75 re-
fund bonus treatment in periods 1-30 as well. Average contributions are also significantly
greater in the heterogeneous than the homogeneous condition when the refund bonus is
0.25 (for late periods 31-60); but they are significantly lower in the heterogeneous than
15
185
190
195
200
205
210
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
A
ve
ra
ge
 C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
Period
Panel A: Average Aggregate Contribution: N=5, Homogeneous Value
(5-period moving average)
Refund Bonus=0.25
Refund Bonus=0.50
Refund Bonus=0.75
185
190
195
200
205
210
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
A
ve
ra
ge
 C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
Period
Panel B: Average Aggregate Contribution: N=5, Heterogeneous Value
(5-period moving average)
Refund Bonus=0.25
Refund Bonus=0.50
Refund Bonus=0.75
Figure 3: Average Aggregate Contribution
homogeneous condition when the refund bonus is 0.50 or 0.75.10 Again, as we argue
10This conclusion holds for both the random effects regressions and the nonparametric Wilcoxon tests
for the late periods, but for the early periods the differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous
treatments for 0.50 and 0.75 are only significant using the Wilcoxon tests. As noted in the previous
footnote, for the independent group-level averages employed in the nonparametric tests we exclude
periods 1-10 and 31-40 to minimize the influence of initial learning and hysteresis effects.
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below, the observed deviation from the Nash equilibrium play is consistent with a model
of bounded rationality.
Result 3 (Coordination). In the homogeneous values environment, groups coordinate
to repeat aggregate contributions on exactly 200 in the 0.25 and 0.50 refund bonus treat-
ments and on exactly 199 in the 0.75 refund bonus treatment and in later periods. The
variance in neither aggregate nor individual contributions is significantly different across
refund bonus conditions.
Table 2: Estimated Likelihood of Repeating Aggregate Contributions of 200 or 199 (Ho-
mogeneous Values Environment)
Early periods 1-30 Late periods 1-30
r=0.25 r=0.50 r=0.75 r=0.25 r=0.50 r=0.75
G = 200 in
period t if:
G = 200 in
period t-1
0.438 0.500 0.154 0.732 0.698 0.134
G 6= 200 in
period t-1
0.121 0.134 0.146 0.184 0.178 0.238
G = 199 in
period t if:
G = 199 in
period t-1
0.147 0.145 0.325 0.295 0.408 0.549
G 6= 199 in
period t-1
0.063 0.064 0.060 0.144 0.136 0.111
Note: Likelihoods estimated from a random effects probit model (marginal effects displayed).
Support : Table 2 reports the likelihood of groups repeating aggregate contributions of 200
or 199 in consecutive periods, displaying marginal effects of a series of probit regression
models. The top section of the table indicates that groups contribute an aggregate amount
of 200 relatively infrequently (12 to 24 percent of the time) if they did not contribute
200 in the previous period. If groups contributed 200 in the previous period and the
refund bonus is 0.25 or 0.50, then the likelihood they contribute 200 again triples or
quadruples, which is in line with our prediction. This increase is highly statistically
significant (p − values < 0.01). By contrast, groups do not significantly change their
likelihood of contributing 200 in this case when the refund bonus is 0.75.
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The lower part of Table 2 shows that groups contribute an aggregate amount of 199
between 6 and 14 percent of the time if they did not contribute 199 in the previous period.
The likelihood they contribute 199 is greater when they contribute 199 in the previous
period, but in the early periods 1-30 this increase is not statistically significant when the
refund bonus is 0.25 or 0.50. The increase is much larger and is highly significant when
the refund bonus is 0.75 and in the late periods 31-60. Similar probit models estimated
for the heterogeneous values environment provide substantially weaker results because of
the low frequency that groups exactly chose 200 or 199.
Since the Nash equilibrium is unique in only the 0.50 refund bonus treatment, we
expected contribution variance to be lower in this treatment because the coordination
problem of multiple equilibria is avoided. Individual contribution variances, however, are
usually not significantly different across the refund bonus treatments. The contribution
variance is lower in the 0.50 refund than the 0.25 refund bonus treatment only in the
late periods for the heterogeneous values treatment. No other pairwise differences across
refund bonus treatments are statistically significant. (These conclusions are identical
both for random effects regressions and for nonparametric Wilcoxon tests.)
Result 4 (Information/Value Asymmetry). Variance in total contributions is greater
with heterogeneous than with homogeneous valuations in all refund bonus conditions.
Table 3: Average Standard Deviation in Aggregate Group Contributions
r = 0.25 r = 0.50 r = 0.75
Homog.
values
Heterog.
values
Homog.
values
Heterog.
values
Homog.
values
Heterog.
values
Periods 11-30 7.3 14.6 9.5 14.7 9.0 15.0
Periods 41-60 4.9 10.9 4.1 10.3 3.4 11.4
Support : Table 3 displays the standard deviation in group contributions for the early
and late periods, averaged across the independent groups in each treatment. (As in
the previous analyses, we exclude periods 1-10 and 31-40 to minimize the influence of
initial learning and hysteresis effects.) In contrast to our prediction, the variance of total
group contributions is significantly greater in the heterogeneous than the homogeneous
18
value environments in both the early and late periods for the 0.25 and 0.75 refund bonus
treatments and in the late periods of the 0.50 refund bonus treatment. This table also
illustrates the decline in contribution variance over time, indicating greater coordination.
Result 5 (Distributive Efficiency). Individual contributions to the PG increase in
the consumer’s PG value in the heterogeneous value environment, resulting in (approxi-
mate) distributive efficiency. This holds across all refund bonus conditions.
Support : Figure 4 displays scatterplots of individual contributions for each PG value in
the heterogeneous values environment for the later periods 41-60. (We omit the similar
figures for the early periods, which–as already documented–exhibit considerably greater
variance.) While clearly the subjects do not contribute a constant fraction of their value,
the displayed linear contribution function explains about half or more of the variance in
contributions in these later periods. Moreover, the fitted contribution function is similar
to the 2/3 value that results in distributive efficiency. The fitted regression lines are
estimated with considerable precision, however, and can reject the joint hypothesis that
the contribution = 2/3 value in all three refund bonus treatments.
4.2. Comparison to Provision without Refund Bonuses
The analysis to this point considers only the three treatments with refund bonuses.
Consistent with theory, results show that provision is more common in the 0.25 and 0.50
refund bonus treatments in which non-provision is not an equilibrium, compared to the
0.75 refund bonus treatment. Provision and contributions are greatest for the 0.25 refund
bonus treatment. In this section we compare provision rates and contributions of this
treatment with the provision point problem without refund bonuses.
Result 6 (No Refund Bonuses). Without refund bonuses, the public good is funded
significantly less frequently in late periods with heterogeneous values and with larger (10
person) groups compared to the 0.25 refund bonus. Average group contributions are also
sometimes significantly lower without refund bonuses.
Support : Figure 5A displays the rate that the PG is funded for the treatment without
refund bonuses, compared to the treatment with a refund bonus of 0.25, and Figure 5B
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provides a similar comparisons for average individual contributions. The experimental
design includes data for both homogeneous and heterogeneous value conditions for the
small groups (N = 5), but only homogeneous values for the large groups (N = 10).
Funding rates and average contributions without refund bonuses are usually lower than
or similar to the 0.25 refund bonus mechanism, with the exception of the late periods in
the homogeneous N = 5 treatment. (Only 25 subjects participated in the late periods
for this treatment, and the performance in this treatment is not significantly different
from the 0.25 refund bonus treatment.) For statistical comparisons we employ the same
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tests used previously to compare the different refund bonus treatments. These tests
reveal that the PG provision rate is significantly lower without refund bonuses in the
late periods with heterogeneous values (N = 5), with large groups (N = 10) when
pooling across periods, and with large groups in the early periods (for this last result at
only the ten-percent significance level). Group contribution levels are significantly lower
without refund bonuses in the late periods with heterogeneous values (N = 5) and in
the early periods with homogeneous values and small groups (N = 5). For the large
groups (N = 10) contributions are lower (at the ten-percent significance level) in the
early periods.
5. Bounded rationality
While the Nash equilibrium predictions find strong experimental support in the 0.25
and 0.75 refund bonus treatments, support is weaker for the 0.50 treatment. In the latter
treatment, the rate of provision is smaller than predicted especially with heterogeneous
values and, despite the unique Nash equilibrium, the variance of contributions is no
different from other treatments with multiple equilibria. However, if we replace the
Nash assumption of perfect rationality with the assumption of bounded rationality that
underlies the quantal response equilibrium (QRE), see Rosenthal (1989) and McKelvey
and Palfrey (1995), the model obtains a closer fit to experimental data. Refined with
bounded rationality, the model can explain subjects’ behavior in the 0.50 treatment
as well as the observed differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous value
treatments. At the same time, the empirical findings consistent with Nash equilibrium
also remain consistent with QRE.
In what follows, we characterize the distribution of aggregate contributions when
a consumer’s probability of contributing a specific amount increases in the associated
expected payoff, and then we discuss the empirical implications.
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5.1. Distribution of aggregate contributions
Adopting the continuous version of the logit probabilistic choice framework, we define
consumer i’s probability density fi(gi) of contributing gi by an exponential function
fi(gi) =
exp(piei (gi)/µ)∫ g
0
exp(piei (g)/µ)dg
, i = 1, ..., N, (3)
of the expected payoff piei determined by
piei (gi) = (vi − gi) Pr(G ≥ C | gi) + rgi Pr(G < C | gi). (4)
In (3), µ > 0 is a noise parameter that measures the degree of bounded rationality, and
we set an upper bound of g on individual contributions. Denoting the distribution of
total contributions G−i of consumers other than i by F−i, we can express the conditional
probabilities of provision and non-provision as Pr(G ≥ C | gi) = 1 − F−i(C − gi) and
Pr(G < C | gi) = F−i(C − gi), respectively. The (logit) QRE is a vector of densities (fi),
i = 1, ..., N , that is a fixed point of (3).
The probability density of aggregate contributions, denoted by h(G), is given by the
convolution of individual densities (fi) equal to
h(G) =
∫
A(G) exp(
∑
i pi
e
i (gi)/µ)dg
K
, (5)
where A(G) = (g : ∑i gi = G) is the set of vectors g which elements sum up to G,
and K is a constant that ensures integration to 1. Thus, the probability density h(G)
is proportional to the exponent of the sum of expected individual payoffs when G is
contributed in total.
In equilibrium, when the noise parameter µ is relatively small, the sum of expected
individual payoffs conditional on G can be approximated by the sum of actual payoffs
N∑
i
piei (gi) '
N∑
i
pii(gi, G) = Π(G). (6)
The reason is that the probability mass is concentrated around C when µ is relatively
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small (at the limit µ→ 0, quantal response equilibrium reduces to Nash equilibrium). It
implies that each individual contributor has an accurate account of the behavior of others
and, thus, Pr(G ≥ C | gi) can well be approximated by a 0-1 step function of individual
contribution gi. Then, the density h(G) is given by
h(G) =

l(G) exp(rG/µ)
K
if G < C,
l(G) exp((V−G)/µ)
K
if G ≥ C,
(7)
where l(G) is the measure of the set A(G). With little noise, the probability density
of QRE aggregate contributions is proportional to the exponent of the actual aggregate
payoff.
When the approximation in (6) is not accurate, a closed-form expression for the density
function h(G) arising in QRE is difficult to obtain. In this case, and as it is undertaken
in the analysis below, we revert to the numerical solution in determining h(G) using the
same parameter values as in the experiment and, in particular, the strategy space of
discrete contributions.
5.2. Empirical implications and evidence
Aggregate contributions in homogeneous value treatment
Figure 6 plots the empirical distributions of aggregate contributions in the homoge-
neous value treatments and Table 4 reports the percentage of periods with contributions
that strictly exceed the threshold for all treatments. Comparing the distributions in Fig-
ure 6 with the corresponding aggregate payoffs plotted in Figure 1, we can immediately
notice considerable similarity between the plots – the graph of the frequency distribution
mimics that of the aggregate payoffs. In particular, the sign and the magnitude of the dif-
ference between the contribution frequencies around 200 closely match the corresponding
differences in aggregate payoffs. In the 0.50 refund bonus treatment, where payoffs differ
only slightly when contributions are at and below the provision point, we accordingly
observe relatively symmetric frequencies around the provision point. While inconsistent
with the Nash equilibrium, the observed pattern of aggregate contributions is consistent
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with QRE predictions made for small levels of noise µ. (Result 3 on coordination pat-
terns shows that consumers manage to coordinate rather closely at the point of provision,
providing support for small levels of noise.)
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Table 4: Percentage of Periods with Excess Contributions, Periods 31-60
Refund Bonus Treatment
r = 0 r = 0.25 r = 0.50 r = 0.75
Homogeneous N = 5 37.3% 28.0% 29.3% 18.6%
Heterogeneous N = 5 42.0% 55.1% 33.0% 25.6%
Homogeneous N = 10 31.7% 40.0%
Homogeneous vs. heterogeneous value treatments
As Result 4 indicates, there are significant differences in contribution variance between
the homogeneous and heterogeneous value treatments. Figure 7 plots the empirical dis-
tributions of aggregate contributions in the heterogeneous value treatments, from which
we observe a wider dispersion of contributions compared with the homogeneous value
case. While not predicted by the Nash equilibrium, this observation, however, is con-
sistent with the predictions of the model of bounded rationality. As the heterogeneous
value environment is more complex, we can arguably expect more noise in the decision
making process, which implies a higher value of µ in the model. The consequence of this
is a wider dispersion of contributions as differences in payoffs weigh less for probability
density as it can be seen from eq. (3).
Comparing Figures 6 and 7, we can notice that the effect of heterogeneity is not uni-
form across the treatments. In the 0.25 treatment, the effect is a shift of more probability
mass to the right from the provision point but to the left in the 0.50 and 0.75 treatments,
so producing the differences in the rate of provision and in average aggregate contribu-
tions presented in Results 1 and 2, respectively. Table 4 also shows a substantially larger
increase with heterogeneity in the instances of excess contributions with r = 0.25 than
with other refund bonus rules. Again, the model of bounded rationality is consistent with
this pattern. At the limit µ → 0, where the QRE coincides with the Nash equilibrium,
the entire probability mass is concentrated around 200 or, respectively, 199 in the 0.75
treatment. An increase in µ will have an effect on the rate of provision and aggregate
contributions depending on the direction of the dispersion of probability mass. When r
is small so that rC < V − C, more probability mass will spread to the right from 200
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as payoffs are higher there, also implying an increase in expected total contributions.
But the converse holds for the case when the refund bonus r is high, rC ≥ V − C, as
more probability mass is attracted to the left of 200.11 Intuitively, given noisier behav-
ior, consumers tend to contribute more when the refund bonus is low in order to hedge
themselves against the risk of an unfavorable outcome G < C, but the converse holds
when the refund bonus is high.12 Consistent with this intuition, for different levels of
noise µ Figure 8 plots the rates of provision and expected aggregate contributions from
the numerical solution of the QRE model iteratively solved for the treatments with ho-
mogeneous valuations and the upper bound for individual (discretized) contributions set
at g = 200.
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Figure 8: QRE outcomes for different levels of noise when N = 5
Distributive efficiency
Result 5 shows that the properties of the mechanism related to distributive efficiency
are similar across all refund bonus treatments. From the perspective of Nash equilibrium
11At r = 0.50, where rC = V −C, the model still predicts more probability mass to the left of 200 as
the aggregate payoff decays faster to the right of 200 than to the left.
12This intuition is confirmed by comparing individual contributions of consumers who have value
v = 60 in the heterogeneous treatment with contributions in the homogeneous treatment. In the 0.25
heterogeneous value treatment, individual contributions are statistically higher but in the 0.50 and 0.75
treatments they are lower than contributions in the corresponding homogeneous value treatments.
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predictions, one could argue that the contribution of about two thirds of the private value
is a focal choice in the coordination game irrespective of the size of refund bonus. The
model refined with bounded rationality can substantiate this argument. To illustrate
this point, Figure 9 plots the QRE individual contribution densities fi(gi) for the case
of heterogenous values with the noise parameter set at µ = 1.13 With refund bonus
r = 0.50, the modal contribution coincides with the Nash equilibrium of two thirds of the
private value. For other bonus rules the modal contribution is similar, consistent with
the observed similarities in distributive efficiency across the treatments.
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Figure 9: QRE individual contribution densities fi(gi)
13In calculating QRE for each refund bonus rule, we used the same initial weights uniformly distributed
over the individual strategy space set at {0, 1, ..., 199, 200}. The pattern of individual densities shown in
Figure 9 is robust to different initial weights and also to values of noise parameter µ. The choice of µ = 1
seems to be in a range appropriate for what we see in the data and numerical QRE solutions presented
earlier. In general, the scale for µ is arbitrary and cannot be compared across studies because it depends
directly on the nominal scale for denoting payoffs.
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Comparison with no refund bonuses
Figure 8 also plots the QRE rate of provision and expected aggregate contribution for
the standard mechanism of no refund bonuses (r = 0). The QRE outcomes conform with
the economic intuition presented prior to Hypothesis 6.14 In deciding whether and how
much to contribute, consumers weigh gains and losses of their decision, where the gain is
an increase in the probability of provision and the loss is the monetary cost of contribution.
When the level of noise µ is low, consumers are pivotal with a high probability which
prompts them to contribute. Furthermore, as outcomes G < 200 are less favorable when
no refund bonuses are offered, we even see higher contributions compared to the 0.25
refund bonus case. However, with levels of noise increasing, individual consumers have
less control over the likelihood of success. Then, as it follows from eq. (4), with the success
rate Pr(G ≥ C | gi) becoming less dependent on individual contributions, consumers
reduce their contributions because now losses loom larger than gains. As a result, we
obtain the rapid decay of the provision rate and expected aggregate contributions depicted
in Figure 8. For larger group sizes, this decay starts at lower values of µ as now an
individual contribution becomes less likely to be pivotal, which is illustrated in Figure
10 that compares QRE outcomes for the empirically studied cases of r = 0 and r = 0.25
when N = 10. These QRE patterns are consistent with the empirical evidence presented
in Result 6.
6. Conclusion
This paper tests a new extension of the provision point mechanism with refund
bonuses. We distinguish two motivations for this study, theoretical and practical. Re-
garding the theoretical motivation, the extension improves the standard provision point
mechanism up to strict implementation. In particular, refund bonuses help eliminate in-
efficient equilibria in the problem of fundraising for public goods and, as a consequence,
implement the public good uniquely. The mechanism is robust to information distribution
14Similarly to the argument of Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) earlier discussed, the zero-contribution
outcome is not QRE unless there are nuisance costs of contribution.
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Figure 10: QRE outcomes for different levels of noise when N = 10 and C = 400
and can achieve allocative and distributive efficiency. Our experimental results show that
subjects respond to the incentives brought about by refund bonuses in predicted ways.
Specifically, the Nash equilibrium predictions of allocative and distributive efficiency find
strong empirical support, whereas experimental results on equilibrium coordination and
invariance to information distribution are better explained by the model refined with
bounded rationality.
The practical motivation for this study comes from the potential applicability of the
extension given the wide use of the provision point mechanism in crowdfunding. As
argued earlier, there are concerns about future growth prospects of crowdfunding and
its success rate. This proposed new mechanism may alleviate some of these concerns
and this initial empirical evidence is promising, although caution is always warranted
when drawing potential policy implications from initial results provided by simplified
laboratory experiments. Significantly, our results show that the refund bonus rule need
not be generous – the best results are obtained for the least generous refund bonus used,
i.e., r = 0.25. Moreover, the mechanism with a low bonus rate performed equally well in
a more complex environment with heterogeneous valuations, and reached a success rate of
up to 80% in later periods. Drawing on the model with bounded rationality supported by
our experimental results, a similar performance can be expected even with smaller refund
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bonuses so minimizing the risks involved, but this question is left for future research.
There are more avenues for future research that should be explored to investigate the
practical applicability of the mechanism with refund bonuses. An important question is
how the mechanism performs in a dynamic setting akin to that used by crowdfunding
platforms. A dynamic setting may further alleviate the problem of equilibrium coordina-
tion, which, as our results show, is still present. Another interesting question relates to
the source of refund bonuses and its effect on contribution behavior. In our experiment,
the source of refund bonuses is exogenous, yet in practical applications it would need
to be endogenous, e.g., a campaigner’s own contribution, first-movers’ seed money, or
insurance premiums paid by successful campaigners. Lastly, more research is needed on
aggregate uncertainty and group size effects, which could be ideally done in a field study.
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